

Economic Analysis of Asian Growth Triangles —The Johor–Singapore–Riau Growth Triangle

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Abstract

In looking at the Asian economy, particularly the Growth Triangle which includes Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, one can infer a great deal. With the Asian monetary crisis affecting the world, and certainly the Asian region in particular, some economists believe it is a mistake to evaluate such matters based on tradition. Rather, a school of thought dubbed the New Institutional Economics has come into being and while not everyone considers it to be a truly new approach, the bottom line is that it is different from mainstream thought in the discipline.

I. Introduction

In looking at the Asian economy, particularly the Growth Triangle which includes Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, one can infer a great deal. With the Asian monetary crisis affecting the world, and certainly the Asian region in particular, some economists believe it is a mistake to evaluate such matters based on tradition. Rather, a school of thought dubbed the New Institutional Economics has come into being and while not everyone considers it to be a truly new approach, the bottom line is that it is different from mainstream thought in the discipline.

In analyzing the region, one must look at Asia's unique people and difficult history. With Asia's resources many believe that the region should have done better economically but that political strategies had held things back. Presently, it is important to look at the past but not dwell on it. It is a unique time where the region is faced with serious problems due to the currency crisis. However, with the utilization of New Institutional Economics, the past will be discussed, including the history of the growth triangle, its present state and the area's political past. Demographic information will then be considered before an analysis of the area is completed to perhaps glimpse the future of a region that is currently being discussed in both economic and political circles.

II. The Asian Growth Triangle

Growth triangles have been part of a recent international trend, especially in Asia, where economic growth has spread a great deal.¹ Growth Triangles are an interesting illustration of

sub-regional economic cooperation and further, illustrate the nexus between national, regional and international dynamics, where it becomes virtually impossible to discuss economic transformation in any location in isolation from a wider perspective.² There are several growth triangles in Southeast Asia.³ The one which is the focus of this paper is the triangle which exists between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia (see, Figure 1).

This triangle that began in Singapore had its start in 1989, when Goh Chok Tong announced that Singapore, along with neighboring areas of Malaysia and Indonesia could form a *triangle of growth*.⁴ Soon, what was called “*The Growth Triangle*” and became known as both a geographic location and an economic concept.⁵ The relationship can in some way be looked upon as maintaining a similarity in the nature of the political boundaries and economic exchanges in pre-colonial Southeast Asia.⁶ Despite the historical associations, the situation as it exists today is not a rediscovery or throwback to an historical period.⁷ Rather, the basic idea of the triangle was to combine Singaporean capital, management, and technical expertise with the cheaper and more abundant land and labor of Riau and Johor in order to enhance regional economic development.⁸ This made sense. It is one reason why westerners invest in Asia anyway. That is, because of the availability of cheap land and cheap labor such investments are attractive to countries that do not have such available to them. Similarly, the union between nations that share geographic borders but differ economically and in natural resources as well, seemed like a move that couldn't lose.

The main purpose of the union, as intended by Singapore, was to provide an incentive for multinational corporations and to consider the region as a whole for investment purposes.⁹ Again, the aim was to lure the multinationals to seek a mixture of inexpensive labor along with skilled professionals within an efficient infrastructure.¹⁰ This extension of economic activity made good business sense and the geographic proximity, too, was an asset as it implied smaller transportation and communication expenses.¹¹

The Growth Triangle also had another intent which was to enhance inflows of investment and facilitate sub-regional cooperation in business and tourism.¹² Growth triangles do seem to be a good idea. Some have suggested that the concept is a uniquely Asian solution to the problem of achieving regional and economic integration between countries at different stages of development.¹³

There are many differing views of the concept of the growth triangle. Some ASEAN members see them as being supportive of broader trade liberalization objectives under AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area).¹⁴ Regional governments believe that they form models for full scale economic integration at a later date, as well as being a vehicle which attracts foreign investments.¹⁵ It is also interesting to look at growth triangles separate and apart from econom-

ics. The formation of growth triangles is motivated as much for political purposes as for economic ones; thus, participating ASEAN governments face important issues in their overall national policy development.¹⁶ Among these is the need to be confronted due to the intense competition for investment with different growth triangles which compete with each other for foreign investment.¹⁷ This is an important consideration.

Other concerns may center around national sovereignty which might come about in metropolitan spillover growth; hinterland areas such as Johore may begin to function more as extensions of the core, Singapore, rather than as part of Malaysia, as the economic dependence on the core increases. A similar concern in Indonesia has surfaced as some have expressed uneasiness about the degree to which Singapore dominates Batam's development.¹⁸ The establishment of growth triangles involves very complex political relationships and negotiations.¹⁹ Despite some concerns, the EAAU sees the outlook for growth triangles as being positive.²⁰

To assess exactly what has taken place in the creation of the triangle, several things must be understood. The nature of the Triangle must be considered and some questions which surface are exactly how Singapore's interests, both short-term and long-term, had been served by its decision to build up the established links in the area.²¹ Singapore has done okay but there have been some problems.

For example, Singapore's progress toward its goal of becoming the Switzerland of the Far East has been dampened by its lack of diversification toward outward foreign investments.²² In 1991, it invested only \$ 701 million U.S. dollars in overseas projects and Singapore's total investment in China between 1979 and 1991 was just \$ 897 million U.S. funds.²³ By contrast, Taiwan and Hong Kong collectively had invested an estimated 30 billion U.S. dollars in China for a period of one decade.²⁴

Singapore's relationship with Malaysia and Indonesia comes with an intent to move its low-end production offshore to Johore and Batam.²⁵ Thus, in this Growth Triangle, Singapore is expected to provide the expertise, while its less-developed partners provide the land and labor for many operations.²⁶ Also, Singapore has embarked on a major project in China, which is the start-up of an industrial park in Suzhou, near Shanghai, which would be run by Singapore.²⁷ Obviously, Singapore is the major force in the triangle.

III. New Institutional Economics

In discussing the New Institutional Economics, one needs to look at a man by the name of Doug North, a man who pioneered the concept and received a Nobel Prize in the field of economics.²⁸ North, despite his impressive stint in formal education, claims to have learned about economics from playing chess.²⁹ The man, while more politically to the left, certainly leans

right in his support of the free market economy.³⁰ He first accepted the usual economic principles as a guide to the truth but came to believe that they didn't explain why people behave as they do.³¹ Eventually, he concluded that other institutions in society mattered at least as much to economic development. This started him on the road to economic history.³²

North became a pioneer of what is known as the New Institutional Economics and also called it Cliometrics.³³ What North did was to apply economic principles to the study of history and, in this way, believed he could discern what caused some societies to develop, while others did not.³⁴ Along with such new insights, he became convinced that traditional economic theory was wrong and found a model of rational man acting in perfect pursuit of his economic self-interest to be simply ridiculous.³⁵ While traditional economists stress the importance of natural resources, capital, technology and education, North focused on economies in the abstract; simply caring to know how people behave over time in order to explain economic outcomes more described North's mentality.

North did come across some difficulty when examining history with quantitative tools as some societies were rich in resources but hardly developed at all.³⁶ For example, Spain conquered the New World, which brought the country a great deal of wealth but it did not fully develop in the economic sense.³⁷ England and the Netherlands did much better with a great deal less. Thus, North's ideas begin to make sense. Such historical references do provide proof that the will of the people, the culture and the religions which are dominant in the area are all important in determining the economic fate of a nation. North did study institutions by examining their cultures to see how they created incentives for productive behavior.³⁸

North tried to measure the past, not just giving a reinterpretation of it. He began by doing major work in economic statistics where he painstakingly measured changes in currency, trade volume, prices and wages, as well as a look at other indicators.³⁹ His work was important in showing how economies truly developed. One of his early studies focused on trans-Atlantic shipping and the economist found that productivity improved sharply in the 19th century.⁴⁰ Originally it was thought that such a phenomenon was caused by the birth of technology but North found that the key factor was actually the growing supremacy of the British Navy.⁴¹ It was found that the more space provided for cargo, the wage bill for running a ship was greatly reduced.⁴² Also, many technological advances came much later anyway. North also examined Europe, trying to find out how the society evolved from a feudal system to modern capitalism.⁴³ He found that the rise of cities, an evolving trading culture, new means of procuring and changes in military technology all reduced the value of the lord's military services. Thus, the feudal manor system gradually decayed.⁴⁴

North believed that what he called legal and social "rules of the game" are what determine

the nature of the game.⁴⁵ If a society has created laws which make property secure and debt payments predictable, that counts as much as anything else in stimulating the economy.⁴⁶ One can see how North's view is at odds with those who uphold traditional economics. In looking at North's work, and the evolution of the New Institutional Economics, it becomes clear that perhaps social and cultural factors are all too often overlooked when evaluating nations. In looking at Asia, one can easily see how these can be missed. That is why it is so very important to look at Asia's history, and not just in the economic sense, in determining its financial future.

It is also important to understand the principles in institutional economics. North also looked at informal rules or social norms as well as religion and belief systems.⁴⁷ Interestingly, and integral to the theory, is the notion that because most people aren't familiar with economic principles, they are not influenced by them.⁴⁸ Other theorists also have their hands in new institutional economics. Oliver Williamson elaborated on Coase's theory into a transaction cost framework that resembled even Veblen's approach in certain aspects.⁴⁹ Coase became famous for posing a question that had economists puzzled. He asked "if the price mechanism is the most efficient mechanism for allocating resources in a market economy, why do firms exist?"⁵⁰ The answer was that economic agents incurred transaction costs when using the price mechanism; additionally, it was gleaned that the greater the number, and the complexity, of transactions, the greater the costs involved in transacting.⁵¹

Williamson, following in Coase's footsteps, elaborated on the reasons that transactions were costly; he noted that uncertainty, idiosyncraticity, complexity, informational asymmetry, and opportunism were inherent to transactions so firms emerged, and merged, to reduce the cost of transactions with other firms.⁵² Some lessons drawn from Williamson's work are that firms operate within an environment where market power does not truly matter; also, it is important to note that firms try first and foremost to economize.⁵³ The new economic perspective does have its share of critics though.

Knoedler⁵⁴ leads one to believe that more traditional economists may indeed be more historically grounded than the new institutional economists; he contends that the reason for the seeming success of the latter group is that they have the noted advantage of twenty-twenty hindsight. He also contends that claims of "newness" for such positions certainly deserve some critical scrutiny. Thus, the approach may not be all that new. Nevertheless, the primary difference between this "new" school and traditional economics is its focus on social and cultural aspects. Psychology is taken into account. What will the people do? What do the people want? Rather than analyze raw statistics, the problem is looked at from a common sense perspective. In discussing the Asian Growth Triangle, while using an approach taken from the New Institutional Economics, it is important to explore the history of the region as well in order to ana-

lyze the economic position and the future of the area.

IV. A Look At Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia

It is perhaps most important to look at the history of the region, as a whole, than any individual nation. ASEAN has become quite a popular entity; it was formed in 1967 when Southeast Asia urgently needed a multilateral forum to reconcile its nations and try to resolve differences.⁵⁵ The organization was founded at the height of the Cold War and the region had become a backdrop for the ideological war waged between the two superpowers that ruled at the time.⁵⁶ Further, Southeast Asia was filled with bloody conflicts, and that made it impossible for the region to adequately develop its economy; leaders knew that the situation would keep their people in perpetual backwardness.⁵⁷ That was why ASEAN was indeed formed.

Thus, when Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand came together in 1967, everyone thought it good news and the political situation in maritime Southeast Asia did gradually stabilize in the seventies.⁵⁸ Much of the activity in the region involved control by the world powers; also, the practice of the Soviet Union and China in Southeast Asia generally embraced the goal of preventing the extensive involvement of the United States in the region.⁵⁹ The Vietnam War, in part, resulted as an offshoot of the struggle. ASEAN tried to deal with the cold war by remaining neutral and after the Vietnam War was over, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, which emphasized the indivisibility of political stability within member countries, and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, were signed.⁶⁰ But for years, ASEAN struggled with Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia.⁶¹

The post-Cold War time period had enveloped rapid changes in the evolution of Southeast Asia as a region and the cold war itself had led to extensive superpower involvement in the locale; it also allowed for the formation of a security community through ASEAN.⁶² However, ASEAN itself became involved in the cold war and its most sound policies, especially those aimed at Vietnam, were also a function of the cold war.⁶³

Nussbaum,⁶⁴ contends that if it were not for communist threat, Asia might have been quite different in the nineties. He also noted that Japan had a great presence in the region and for about 30 years where the climate was positive. Japan and the rest of Asia adapted the region's high savings rates, strong work ethic, and enormous labor supply and as growth rates soared, poverty was cut sharply, and a huge middle class erupted for the first time in Asian history. The U.S. secured strong allies in the area and was able to take advantage of cheap products made in the area as well.⁶⁵ In fact, Nussbaum blames those antiquated cold-war structures for its downfall.

Asia did have strengths and this was perhaps taken advantage of. These included the fact

that the region had cheap land and a lot of it, as well as cheap labor; this helped to keep the system flourishing.⁶⁶ However, with the changing economic climate, and the demand on all areas to produce good, cheap products fast, Asia had lost its edge.⁶⁷ It was perhaps due to Asia's brief bout with success that the region was praised by the West. A great deal of products at unbeatable prices had come from its factories and the effect of a rising middle class likely gave its people hope. Unfortunately, the social problems did not go away. The problems that the region has with child labor is still very much integrated in a world that abhors such practices. Much of the dreams of the people were built on credit rather than cash. Thus, the impact of the sudden monetary crisis took many businesses rather quickly.

Despite the current economic crisis, over the years, one political assumption often made is that the growing economic strength of East Asia had affected America's power because the small countries were no longer dependent on the United States for aid and their economies had become resilient enough to withstand sanctions.⁶⁸ In early 1992, for example, the Indonesian government rejected Dutch aid and dismissed Dutch development workers in response to Dutch criticism of the November 1991 massacre in East Timor.⁶⁹ Additionally, China faced down the United States over most favored nation (MFN) trade status; in relation to that, after the British press told the world that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher promised aid for Malaysia's Pergau dam in exchange for Malaysian purchases of British arms, the Malaysian government banned all trade with British companies for about half a year after the scandal erupted.⁷⁰

A brief look at the countries in question is appropriate in analyzing the Triangle. According to ASEAN, 1996 inflation rates for Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia are 1.4, 3.5 and 6.5 respectively.⁷¹ Population for Singapore was 3.6 million with a 4.2% growth in population in 1996 and for Malaysia, the same statistics are 21.2 million with a 2.3% growth rate.⁷² Indonesia is the largest with a population of 200 million and continues to grow, having shown a 1.6% rate of growth in 1996.⁷³

Singapore consists primarily of 76.4% Chinese, 14.9% Malay and 6.4% Indians.⁷⁴ There are many religious groups including Buddhist, Atheist, Muslim, Christian, Hindu, Sikh, Taoist and Confucianist.⁷⁵ The official languages of the country are Chinese, Malay, Tamil and English.⁷⁶ The country is a republic within a Commonwealth; it gained independence from Malaysia in 1965.⁷⁷ Singapore has an open entrepreneurial economy with strong service and manufacturing sectors and is an excellent international trading community.⁷⁸

Malaysia is run by a constitutional monarchy, presently by His Excellency Dato' Seri Dr. Mahatir Mohamad whose title is Prime Minister.⁷⁹ The country's major industries are electronics & electrical goods, textiles, clothing, shoes, chemicals, petroleum, wood products, metal

products and rubber.⁸⁰ Religions include Islam, Buddhism, Taoism, Hinduism, and Christianity.⁸¹ Malaysia's population is 21.6 million.⁸² and its literacy rate is 91%.⁸³ The population had grown from a mere 18.6 in 1991.⁸⁴ Economic indicators, over the years, shows that exports have fallen from a 14.1%.⁸⁵ Increase over the prior year, in 1991, to just 6.2%⁸⁶ for the same category in 1992. Inflation is relatively low in the country; the projected figure for 1998 is just 3%.⁸⁷

Indonesia is a republic under the reign of His Excellency Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie and President of the Republic of Indonesia.⁸⁸ Religion in the country is primarily Moslem which is estimated to be at 87% of the population with just 10% Christians and a handful of other religions, including Hinduism and Buddhism, make up the remaining 3%.⁸⁹

Conclusion


In analyzing the data on the Triangle in question, indications are both good and bad. The region has excellent resources and its trade potential is great. Many of the people in the area do not seem to be able to get out of the poverty that they find themselves in and so continue to perpetuate illegal businesses. The people, however, as a rule, are religious and like the traditional. However, they have been plagued by poor economic conditions and have had to live in poverty due primarily to political situations they have endured through the past several decades. It is important to keep in mind that it is still a developing area. It has a long way to go.

While things are not very good now, due in part to the currency crisis and the devaluation to various extents of each of the Asian currencies, the fact that the Triangle exists certainly enhances the chances of these three nations to succeed. Of course, they are in competition with other triangles and liaisons in the region. However, Asia is still quite attractive to the westerners who salivate over cheap land and cheap labor. Singapore has developed a particular affinity to get things done, more so than Indonesia and Malaysia and thus, that nation could very well help the other nations develop. Of course, the others have, in their own right, taken steps toward prosperity. The Malaysian Business Council, for example, has popularized the Vision 2020 campaign whose objective is to move the nation towards the status of being fully developed by the year 2020.⁹⁰

While the goals of the people are admirable, utilizing new institutional economics, it is clear that what has held the region back is politics. The area has been used by other regions, and their own people have suffered as they were never able to fully or fairly compete with their neighbors in other areas of the world. If there is a change in terms of respect and political strategy, there could indeed be a new successful Asia emerge from the struggle it currently encounters. With the possibility of an impending cold war, proliferated by countries in the region, that respect and recognition of Asia's importance is even more likely. From this eco-

conomic perspective, one should view the region with cautious optimism.

Figure 1⁹¹



Endnotes

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